THE JUDICIAL PENSION SHORTCUT: A QUIET EXPLOIT IN GHANA’S CONSTITUTION

 INTRODUCTION

This article is prompted by recent events during the parliamentary vetting of Supreme Court nominees, where questions emerged regarding the implications of Article 155 of the 1992 Constitution—particularly concerning judicial pensions and late-career appointments.

The intersection of Article 155 with the mandatory retirement provisions in Article 145(2) of the 1992 Constitution creates a strategic pathway where senior public service lawyers can transition into the judiciary at age 60, serve a minimum of five years, and secure a lifetime pension equivalent to that of a serving Justice. This arrangement effectively turns late-career judicial appointments into a comfortable retirement plan for those nearing the end of their public service careers.

The focus of this article is to spotlight this under-examined constitutional mechanism and evaluate whether it inadvertently incentivizes such appointments, driven more by strategic retirement planning than by a lasting commitment to justice and service to the nation.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: FROM RETIREMENT TO RE-ENTRY

In Ghana’s legal framework, retirement from public service is traditionally viewed as a dignified conclusion—not an opportunity for strategic re-entry. Article 145(2) of the 1992 Constitution clearly outlines the mandatory retirement ages for Justices of the Superior Courts: 70 years for the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, and 65 years for the High Court and Chairmen of Regional Tribunals. These age limits underscore a broader principle of institutional renewal and generational succession.

Conversely, Article 155 provides generous retirement benefits for Justices who have served with distinction. It specifies that a Justice retiring at or after age 60 is entitled to a pension equal to the salary of a serving Justice, including all future salary increments, provided they have either:

• served ten continuous years as a Justice of the Superior Court, or
• served twenty years in public service, including a minimum of five continuous years as a Justice.

On the surface, this appears to be a fair reward for dedicated service. However, when read alongside Article 145, Article 155 unintentionally creates a strategic loophole—one increasingly used not to serve judicial goals, but to secure financial stability at the twilight of a public legal career.

Under the standard public service framework, most civil servants retire at age 60, receiving pensions under the Three-Tier Pension Scheme, which comprises SSNIT, Tier 2 (occupational lump sum), and any voluntary Tier 3 contributions.

However, for senior public-sector lawyers, Article 155 offers a more lucrative alternative. By obtaining a judicial appointment at age 60 and serving the constitutionally required five years, they can exchange their standard public service pension for a far more generous, constitutionally protected, salary-indexed judicial pension.

This effectively transforms the judiciary into a strategic retirement platform, making it a financially attractive final stop rather than a culmination of lifelong judicial commitment.

 

 

TYPICAL SCENARIO: HOW THE STRATEGY PLAYS OUT

Consider the case of a senior State Attorney with 25 to 30 years of experience in the Attorney-General’s Department. Upon reaching age 60, this individual is due to retire under general public service rules. However, rather than exiting public service, they are appointed to the High Court.

Here’s how the strategy typically unfolds:

At Age 60:

• The individual retires from public service.
• They become eligible to withdraw their Tier 2 lump sum.
• They begin receiving monthly SSNIT pension payments, having met the minimum retirement age and contribution period.

Shortly After:

• The individual is appointed as a Justice—possibly to the High Court or Court of Appeal.
• They serve for five or more continuous years, thereby satisfying Article 155(1)(b), which requires over 20 years in public service, including at least five continuous years as a Justice.

At Age 65 or 70:

• Upon retiring from the judiciary, the individual qualifies for a lifetime judicial pension under Article 155, which:
• Equals the salary of a serving Justice, and
• Is indexed to all future judicial salary increases.

Since dual pension receipt should not be allowed, SSNIT payments would most likely cease once the judicial pension begins. However, the individual would have already benefited from:

• The Tier 2 lump sum payout,
• 5 to 10 years of SSNIT monthly payments, and now,
• A superior, indexed judicial pension.

Thus, what was originally intended to reward enduring judicial service has evolved into a vehicle for strategic retirement enhancement.

IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL INTEGRITY

While this arrangement is entirely legal, it raises important ethical and structural questions. Are such judicial appointments being made on the basis of merit and long-term commitment, or are they simply financial manoeuvers?

The judiciary should remain an institution defined by a calling to uphold and interpret the Constitution—not one that functions as a high-yield retirement strategy. Strategic late-career appointments threaten to erode institutional memory, diminish public trust, and obstruct the long-term reform of the judiciary.

 

 

CONSTITUTIONAL REFLECTION AND REFORM

The framers of Ghana’s Constitution likely envisioned Article 155 as a mechanism to safeguard the financial security of Justices who had devoted their professional lives to the bench. However, the practical outcome now favours short-term appointments that exploit constitutional intent for personal gain.

As Ghana grapples with escalating pension liabilities and pursues judicial reform, it is imperative to re-examine Article 155:

• Should five years on the bench suffice to qualify someone for a lifetime judicial pension?
• Should judicial appointments be used to extend retirement benefits for public servants, rather than to reinforce the judiciary through sustained, merit-based appointments?

These questions cut to the core of fiscal responsibility, public trust, and institutional credibility. Any reform must strike a balance between fairness and sustainability, and between service and self-interest.

CONCLUSION

A constitutional arrangement designed to dignify judicial retirement should not become a tool for exploitation. Articles 145 and 155 were intended to uphold justice, fairness, and long-standing judicial service. In practice, however, they now facilitate a pathway to financial comfort for retiring public servants—at the potential cost of the judiciary’s integrity.

To illustrate this further:

• At age 60, a public servant retires, collects their Tier 2 payout, and begins SSNIT payments.
• Shortly thereafter, they are appointed to the bench for five or more years.
• At age 65 or 70, they transition to a lifetime judicial pension—indexed to salary increases.

This sequence enables individuals to layer three retirement benefits—Tier 2, several years of SSNIT, and a judicial pension—simply by strategically serving five years on the bench.

If we aim to preserve the judiciary’s merit, credibility, and independence, this quiet but consequential practice must be confronted. Judicial appointments must serve the Constitution, not pension strategy.

It is time to address this constitutional loophole—and restore the judiciary to its rightful role: a place of service, not merely of security.